Art 69 sets out the legal consequences of the invalidity of a treaty. In essence, treaty law knows two reasons how a treaty and the legal force of its provisions may come to an end, that is, invalidity and termination (→ Art 42). While invalidity always affects the conclusion or entry into force of a treaty, termination invariably concerns reasons that have occurred after the treaty has been validly concluded. This distinction also bears on the consequences of invalidity and termination, respectively. Thus invalidity generally raises the question whether the effects of the invalid treaty, especially acts that have been carried out in applying, implementing and executing the treaty, also become invalid. In case of termination, this question does not arise as these acts have been performed under a valid treaty (→ Art 70).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
eBook EUR 203.29 Price includes VAT (France)
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Thus, the concept of nullity will for instance vary depending on whether the act is governed by municipal private law or public law. For a discussion see eg RY Jennings Nullity and Effectiveness in International Law in Essays in Honour of Lord McNair (1965) 64, 65–68.
Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264 paras 1–3. See also Waldock [1966-I/2] YbILC 9; UNCLOT I 447. Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264 para 1.See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, GA Res 56/83, 12 December 2001, UN Doc A/RES/56/83. The text of the Articles and the commentaries thereto are included in ILC Report 53rd Session (2001), UN Doc A/56/10, paras 76–77, and are also reproduced in J Crawford The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (2002).
See AD McNair The Law of Treaties (1961) 206–236.Fitzmaurice II 28 (Draft Art 21). In his commentary, Fitzmaurice stated that this provision did not call for special comments, “although the system propounded [was] probably capable of improvement or refinement” (ibid 45).
Waldock II 98 (Draft Art 27 paras 1 and 2). See the discussion in [1963-I] YbILC 229–234. [1963-II] YbILC 216. [1966-II] YbILC 172, 264 (Draft Art 65). For comments of governments see ibid 53–54.UNCLOT III 159; for the amendment see ibid 195 (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.363). Similar amendments were made by Australia and the United States, see ibid (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.297, A/CONF.39/C.1/L.360).
UNCLOT II 126.Art 42 refers in para 2 to termination of a treaty “as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty”.
See text accompanied by n 11.S Verosta Die Vertragsrechtskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen 1968/69 und die Wiener Konvention über das Recht der Verträge (1969) 29 ZaöRV 654, 690; RD Kearney/RE Dalton The Treaty on Treaties (1970) 64 AJIL 495, 555; TO Elias Problems Concerning the Validity of Treaties (1971) 134 RdC 333, 405; C-A Fleischhauer Die Wiener Vertragsrechtskonferenz (1971) 15 JIR 202, 229–231; JA Frowein Zum Begriff und zu den Folgen der Nichtigkeit von Verträgen im Völkerrecht in H Ehmke et al (eds) Festschrift Ulrich Scheuner (1973) 107, 117; J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 6.
UNCLOT I 490–492. See generally UNCLOT III 195–196. To the same effect J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 8. [1963-II] YbILC 214.CL Rozakis The Law on Invalidity of Treaties (1974) 150, 160, who adds that “[i]t is obvious that the invalidation of a consent or treaty remains a private matter to be settled by the parties alone”.
In the French doctrine, this is described as a “faculty” (faculté) which may be resorted to by the parties, see P Cahier Les caractéristiques de la nullité en droit international et tout particulièrement dans la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités (1972) 76 RGDIP 645, 686; J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 10.
Cahier (n 20) 686; contra Villiger Art 69 MN 13. Rozakis (n 19) 161; Cahier (n 20) 686.See eg the ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, ILC Report 58th Session, UN Doc A/61/10 (2006) 110, 111. See also A Boyle Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law in J Crawford/A Pellet/S Olleson The Law of International Responsibility (2010) 95, 104.
Cf Restatement of the Law Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States para 338 comment d; J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 14. See also → MN 23 and 27 (with regard to considerations of good faith) and MN 34.
C Schreuer Unjustified Enrichment in International Law (1974) 22 AJCL 281, 299; C Binder/C Schreuer Unjust Enrichment in MPEPIL (2009) MN 7.
J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 16. See Articles on State Responsibility (n 4), commentary to Art 35, para 5. Villiger Art 69 MN 14. Cf Rozakis (n 19) 163; Frowein (n 15) 118. See the examples mentioned by Frowein (n 15) 109–115. See Art 1 para 4 lit a of the 1947 Peace Treaty with Hungary 41 UNTS 135. Art 25 Peace Treaty with Hungary. Treaty on Mutual Relations 951 UNTS 365.ICJ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 125.
Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 265 para 3. J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 11. Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264 para 3; Villiger Art 69 MN 13. Articles on State Responsibility (n 4), commentary to Art 35, para 2. PCIJ The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) PCIJ Ser A No 17, 47 (1928).Rozakis (n 19) 161. Furthermore, the inclusion of the broad concept of restitution could also mean to include any form of loss of profits that would not have occurred absence the invalidity, at least to the extent this is necessary to counterbalance any form of inequitable benefit.
Contra, however, Villiger Art 69 MN 15, and Frowein (n 15) 119, who argue that para 2 lit b excludes any form of compensation where restitution is not possible under para 2 lit a.
Schreuer (n 25) 299; Binder/Schreuer (n 25) MN 7. See also the observations of the ICJ in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, paras 152–153 (which however were made in the context of State responsibility).
Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264 para 3. Cahier (n 20) 687. Final Draft, Commentary to Art 65, 264 para 3. Frowein (n 15) 119. See Frowein (n 15) 119–120; J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 21. Cahier (n 20) 687.PCIJ The Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Jurisdiction) PCIJ Ser A No 9, 31 (1927); see also ICJ Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (n 42) para 110.
Ibid; see also the comment by the representative of Switzerland UNCLOT I 446. Cf Schreuer (n 25) 299. Frowein (n 15) 120. See generally Binder/Schreuer (n 25) passim, especially MN 6–7, 10–11. Frowein (n 15) 120. This is what Art 69 para 2 lit b stipulates in general terms. See C Tams Enforcing Obligations erga omnes in International Law (2005) 42–46.For this reason, D Greig Invalidity and the Law of Treaties (2006) 90 argues that for the reference to “rules” in para 4 to make sense, “presumably paragraphs (2) and (3) comprise rules, but paragraph (1) cannot be so described”.
See also Art 42 lit b (ii) Articles on State Responsibility (n 4) and J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 23–25.
Final Draft, Commentary to Art 62, 263 para 5. Kearney/Dalton (n 15) 555; Sinclair 233. For a similarly cautious approach see J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 3. M Schröder Treaties, Validity in MPEPIL (2008) MN 24.Villiger Art 69 MN 24. See also Judge Abraham in his separate opinion in ICJ Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections) [2007] ICJ Rep 903, para 31 referring to Art 69 para 1 “which indisputably expresses customary law”.
Similarly J Verhoeven in Corten/Klein Art 69 MN 3.
